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Abstract: In this paper I make a case for a genuine and legitimate role for philosophy in modern Islamic culture. However, I argue that in order to make any progress towards reinstating such philosophical activity, we need to look deep into the nature and essence of modern philosophy. In this paper I aim to do this precisely by challenging modern philosophy’s self conception as an absolute critique (i.e. a critique of everything/anything). I argue that such a conception is not only misconceived, it is also ideological in character. Looking back to its origins, I develop a genealogy of modern philosophy’s self-understanding in order to deconstruct it and disassociate it from other possible alternative conceptions of philosophy. I argue that we should reject the notion of philosophy as absolute critique, as it is ideologically motivated and oppressive.  Instead, I argue for a more modest conception of philosophy as a subject which provides tools for developing human powers of reflection. 

This is an essay (exercise/askesis) in the philosophy of philosophy and not in metaphilosophy, to paraphrase the opening lines from Timothy Williamson’s recent book. As Williamson rightly claims, to talk about philosophy is itself doing philosophy (Williamsons, 2007, pp. ix-x). In this sense a discourse about philosophy cannot be metaphilosophy, done from beyond and above (from an Archimedean vantage point beyond the bounds of specific space and time).​[1]​ Willard Quine, following Otto Neurath, has likened science (and) philosophy “to a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild plank by plank while staying afloat in it” (Quine, 1960, p. 3). Quine uses this metaphor principally to demonstrate the piecemeal character of philosophy, but it can also be invoked (as I have here) to allude to its immanent character. This discussion is closely connected to the nature of philosophy (or at least to the prominent part of it). Philosophy is not only a reflective but also a self reflective enterprise; in it, reflection and self-reflection are intertwined in a unique way. Sociologist Jürgen Habermas has connected this double reflexive character of philosophy to the nature of natural language itself:

Because of the reflexive character of natural languages, speaking about what has been spoken, direct or indirect mention of speech components, belongs to the normal linguistic process of reaching understanding. The expression “metalinguistic judgments” in a natural language about sentences of the same language suggests a difference in level that does not exist. It is one of the most interesting features of natural languages that they can be used as their own languages of explication.
(Habermas, 1998, p. 39).

What Habermas says about natural language applies to philosophy as well; and it is intimately connected to the reflective character of philosophy.
Philosophy has existed in many cultures, and it can be safely said that, in a sense, if the properties of reflection and self-reflection are coterminous with human life, philosophy is also coterminous with human life. Such reflective attitudes towards the self, the universe, and the other can be found in various places across space and time, and the commonality among them can be observed (v. Cohen, 1995; Moore, 1995; Saksena, 1995; Mei, 1995).  However, this slight, almost banal, observation should not lead one to conclude that philosophical reflection has taken the same form across space and time and thus elides the distinctions and specificities which give particular attempts at reflection and self-reflection their unique flavour. 
Modern philosophy shares general characteristics with the philosophical activity of other eras and epochs of human civilisation, but that is not what is interesting in understanding its essence: what is interesting is its uniqueness, that which gives it its differential characteristics (in the lingua of Aristotelian logic, what we are interested in is not its genus but its specific difference). Modern philosophy emerged during a revolutionary epoch in the history of Europe (and by implication the history of the world), an epoch defined by a transition from the medieval worldview to the modern worldview (so called ‘modernity’). This specific history not only defines (at least in part) the modern world (and especially its ‘view’), but also the self-image of philosophy itself: the self-image that philosophy is debating intensely even as the distance from the ‘founding act’ is becoming remote (v. Williams, 2000, Cottingham, 2009, Solomon, 2001). 
The revolutionary character of modern philosophy is most manifest in the writings of its undisputed father, the Frenchman René Descartes,​[2]​ who claimed that all knowledge needs a radical new beginning and new foundations. Descartes was writing in a period (and the same is true of Francis Bacon) when:  

. . . familiar teachings of centuries – about religion, politics, and science – were publicly questioned and sharply disputed across a war-torn Europe. The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century and the on-going Catholic Counter Reformation, together with the proliferation of religious sects and the foundation of new religious orders, highlighted the fragile intellectual foundations on which the apparent unity of Christianity had relied.
 (Clarke, 2006, p. 69)   

This points to the important fact that modern philosophy emerged in a milieu in which Christianity – and especially Catholic Christianity – was still a dominant and ruling force, but which was nonetheless finding itself increasingly on defensive and was losing ground to the new emerging forces of rational debate. Philosophy was one of those forces, and this helped define the self image of philosophy as the revolutionary force without parallel, which corresponds to and is attested by the notion of philosophy as a new beginning (at times an absolute beginning) put forth by both Descartes and Bacon: “Just like Francis Bacon, his contemporary in England, Descartes thought that a new beginning had to be made in human knowledge. The old philosophy of schools could not be reformed: Aristotelianism had to be rejected in toto” (Matthews, 1989, p. 88, emphasis retained; v. Copleston, 1994, 1). Similarly, Francis Bacon saw in the emergence of the new philosophy and the new sciences the prospect for an entirely new age, which would be quantitatively and qualitatively different from its predecessor. The issue here is not whether they were justified in their assumption that they were making a complete break with the past; it suffices for my argument to establish that this is how they saw things. Moreover, as Frederick Copleston aptly notes, they were not entirely unjustified in this self perception: “Men such as Bacon and Descartes were doubtless unaware of the extent to which their minds were influenced by former ways of thought; but their consciousness of standing at the threshold of a new era is not unjustified”(Copleston, 1994, p. 10).  

Thus modern philosophy began its life as part of a revolutionary movement which heralded a new age, an age different from the one which it was aiming to replace. Furthermore, it started its life in an environment in which it was a minority view, albeit one which was growing.​[3]​ These two facts make it natural that the critique​[4]​ of dominant worldviews​[5]​ (medieval civilisation in this instance) became the main vocation of modern philosophy and part and parcel of its self-image – not critique in general, the critique that must accompany any philosophical reflection, but a specific conception of critique, which characterises (and understands) itself as limitless and absolute. This notion was famously articulated by the great German philosopher Immanuel Kant when he wrote: 

Our age is the genuine age of criticism, to which everything must submit. Religion through its holiness and legislation through its majesty commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination.
 (Kant, 1999, p. Axii, emphasis retained)

What is of interest from our perspective in this paper is Kant’s use of the universal quantifier to determine the range of criticism (‘everything’). There are no exceptions; the critique is total. True, Kant was writing in an age considerably different from that of Descartes and Bacon, in an age which, if not already the age of Enlightenment, was at least much nearer to it than that of Descartes and Bacon.​[6]​ And here we can see that the self-conception of philosophy has already started to become detached from the ‘founding act’ (as something which is universal irrespective of space and time). 
Kant’s notion of critique is much more complex than can be explored here, but it can be claimed with some justification that his notion of philosophy as the custodian of reason, as the critique of ‘everything’ has remained. This can be seen in a recent attempt at delimiting the essence (specific difference) of philosophy by a well known and well respected contemporary philosopher and logician Graham Priest. The following two passages are pertinent to our discussion.

What distinguishes the role of criticism in philosophy is, I think, precisely that there is nothing that may not be challenged. Anything is a fit topic for critical scrutiny and potential rejection, including . . . even the efficacy of critical reasoning itself.
 (Priest, 2006, p. 201)

I suggest, then, that philosophy is precisely that intellectual inquiry in which anything is open to critical challenge and scrutiny.
(Ibid., p. 202).

As a good logician, Priest qualifies his claims carefully: he says he does not mean to suggest that every philosophy (or philosopher) actually criticises anything/everything​[7]​; he is only asserting that if they wanted to they could do so. Philosophers qua philosophers and philosophy qua philosophy can potentially criticise everything and anything; nothing is sacrosanct. Priest considers the counterexample of medieval philosophers who typically did not question the claim that God exists; and replies that it does not violate their status as philosophers because if they had wanted to question the existence of God “they could have done so” (p. 201)! This is a bizarre example, and a poor one at that. Barring physical impossibility (at the time) and barring logical impossibility anyone could potentially do anything. What is special about philosophy in that? Such a thin conception of potentiality dilutes the notion of criticism to such an extent that it becomes trivial. Priest’s dilemma here corresponds to the one faced by the modern political theorists, who in order to make room for a diversity of beliefs have put forth the idea of “reasons that all can accept” as the final arbitrator of disputes in the political arena. 
James Bohman and Henry Richardson (2009) have justifiably taken them to task by pressing them to come up with an example of reasons that a person could not accept. As they write:

To be sure, there are plenty of reasons that, as it may be, a person does not accept. Perhaps not caring about flowers, you do not take the presence of famous orchid garden to be a reason to visit Fiji. With a sufficient effort of imagination and “enlarged thinking,” however, surely you could come to accept that as a reason to go there. That is an empirical possibility. 
(p. 257, emphasis retained).

They go on to conclude: “The important question, for our purposes, is really whether it is ever the case that a reason that one single person intelligibly accepts is not also that could be intelligibly accepted by each and every person” (p. 258).
Surely the answer should be a resounding ‘no.’ With such a thin conception of potentiality, then if one person can accept something surely anyone else should (in principle) be able to accept it (assuming they wanted to). In a similar vein, like her modern counterpart the medieval philosopher qua philosopher (and I will say qua human being) could have surely (in principle) rejected or doubted the existence of God (and some actually did). The dilemma faced by Priest is this: If he works with a thin conception of possibility of criticism, it dilutes the uniqueness of philosophy he wants to establish. If he works with a robust conception allowing the possibility of criticism (however defined), then he cannot claim that there was equal (or near equal) possibility of denying the existence of God in medieval philosophy qua philosophy as it is in modern philosophy (in fact in modern philosophy it is the exact opposite; it is becoming increasingly difficult to be a theist doing philosophy of religion in our time). One could avoid this dilemma by either denying that medieval philosophy was really a philosophy (one could say that it was, rather, a theology in disguise). Priest perhaps would not like to take this route because he is eager to preserve the universality of philosophy. Or one can take the route of distinguishing between philosophy in general and the specific forms it takes, in which case Priest’s description would fit modern philosophy (especially its self image) but not philosophy as such. 
I have so far differentiated between philosophy as such and the specific forms it takes, and I would argue that modern philosophy (at least its self-conception) as an absolute critique is one conception of philosophy among many, and it is the product of the specific circumstances in which modern philosophy emerged as a revolutionary force in the 17th century in Western Europe. This specific form cannot be universalised without confusing philosophy in general with one of the specific forms it (historically) took. Insistence on accepting the self conception of modern philosophy as the philosophy, I would argue, is against the spirit of philosophy itself (and against the spirit of reflection and critique in general). It would be closing off the openings for thinking, because one of the things crucial for thought and its prosperity is to always keep open the alternatives, the avenues of thinking differently. Difference is crucial not for its own sake but because it is our only panacea against tyranny. As Michael Foucault puts it: 
But then, what is philosophy today – philosophical activity, I mean – if it is not the critical work of thought on itself? And if it does not consist in the endeavour of knowing how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, rather than legitimating what is already known? There is always something ludicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the outside, to dictate to others, to tell them where their truth is and how to find it, or when it presumes to give them naively positivistic instruction. But it is its right to explore what might be changed, in its own thought, through the practice of a knowledge that is foreign to it. The “essay” – which should be understood as the test by means of which one modifies oneself through the play of truth and not as the simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication – is the living body of philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still what it was in times past, i.e., an “ascesis”, an exercise of the self, in thought.
(Foucault, 1992, pp. 8-9)​[8]​  
This is not to claim that difference is value in itself; it is only to say that without the possibility of real alternatives there is no thinking. Thus, when we press and question a specific philosophy which claims to be universal, we do so in the interest of thinking, reflection, and critique – in sum, in the interest of philosophy itself. 
But thinking also needs particularity, specificity, and situatedness within particular traditions in order to prosper. By denying its own specificity, its own situatedness, modern philosophy also denies the very source of its own life because there is no thinking without thinking in a particular space and time. Thinking transcends particularity only by locating itself surely and securely within its own particularity (and by self-consciously recognising this).  Thus, it is in the interest of thinking that we expose the fallacy of modern philosophy’s claim to universality (which involves the denial of its own particularity). It is also in the interest of thinking itself that we defend various minority traditions of thinking against the imperialistic onslaught of modern philosophy. But that is not to say that one should ‘do’ (adopt) Islamic philosophy (there is no such thing as Islamic philosophy!) instead of Western philosophy (for example). It is, rather, to say that there are ways to do philosophy and aims of doing it within Islamic tradition and culture which cannot be necessarily reduced to ways and aims of doing philosophy within the European tradition,​[9]​ and this anti reductionism is good for both traditions (for example). It is only by preserving its own independent space for philosophising that Islamic culture can learn from the great European tradition of philosophising (which it should) and vice versa. Imperialism is bad not just in the economic arena; it is doubly so in the space of thinking. 
The mistake behind the claim that philosophy is absolute is to ignore two distinct but interrelated aspects of criticism. Let us call them internal (positive) criticism and negative (external) criticism respectively. Internal criticism is a form of self criticism in which one critiques one’s own ideas (on the individual level) or one’s own world view (at the level of the system). In external criticism, on the other hand, one criticises another (individual or system) and her ideas. To put this categorisation in the context of the birth of modern philosophy: as we have seen, its self conception as absolute criticism emerged at the particular juncture of history when philosophy (and her allies) were a minority pitted against the still-dominant but receding and retreating worldview of the civilisation that was dominant in Europe since the middle ages (whether it goes under the name of feudalism or Christendom or Christian civilisation). 
At the time, philosophy naturally criticised everything/anything it could lay its hand on precisely because it was a minority view aiming to destroy and overcome the prevalent worldview. But the same cannot be true today, when modern philosophy (and her allies), are without doubt dominant forces (which, though, obviously does not imply that they have absolute power). Even today modern philosophy is at its best when it takes aim at the remnants of the old forces. But it is a totally different ballgame when philosophy indulges in positive criticism. Self criticism is always much harder than criticising others, and in this modern philosophy is no different than other traditions.  As Bernard Williams, one of the most outstanding and perceptive of post-war British philosophers, writes:

History presents alternatives only in terms of a wider ‘us’: it presents alternative ways, that is to say various ways, in which human beings have lived and hence can live. Indeed, in those terms we may be able to conceive, if only schematically and with difficulty, other ways in which human beings might live in the future. But that is not the point. What in this connection seem to be simply there, to carry no alternatives with them, are elements of our ethical and political outlook, and in those terms there are no alternatives for us. Those elements are indeed unhintergehbar . . . we can identify with the process that led to our outlook because we can identify with the process that led to our outlook because we can identify with its outcome. But we cannot in our thought go beyond our outlook into the future and remain identified with the result: that is to say, we cannot overcome our outlook.
(Williams, 2000, 494, emphasis retained)​[10]​

I would claim that this is typical of modern philosophy when it comes to the investigation of its own worldview and its ultimate foundations. Modern philosophy, which has the reputation of throwing everything upside down, taking nothing as sacrosanct, apparently has its own idols in front of which it trembles lest it utter any unwarranted words. I am not talking about the fringes here; I am talking about mainstream modern philosophy. In modern philosophy, one can come across cogent critiques of scienticism, but one will search in vain for a critique of science as such.  One may come across outstanding critiques of democracy in terms of its practical shortcomings, but one will search in vain for any genuine mainstream critique of democracy as such. The typical response is expressed with atypical honesty by Burt Dreben (referring to John Rawls’ political liberalism):

What Rawls is saying is that there is in a constitutional liberal democracy a tradition of thought which it is our job to explore and see whether it can be made coherent and consistent. . . We are not arguing for such a society. We take for granted that today only a fool would not want to live in such a society . . . If one cannot see the benefits of living in a liberal constitutional democracy, if one does not see the virtue of that ideal, then I do not know how to convince him. To be perfectly blunt, sometimes I am asked, when I go around speaking for Rawls, What do you say to an Adolf Hitler? The answer is [nothing]. You shoot him. You do not try to reason with him. Reason has no bearing on this question. So I do not want to discuss it.
(Dreben, 2003, pp. 328-329)​[11]​
A typical medieval philosopher would have no doubt held the same sentiments about an atheist; a diehard royalist in the early modern age would have harboured similar views about a democrat, and so on. What makes political philosophy (for example) any special in this regard? It is only modern philosophy’s self conception as absolute critique that makes the otherwise understandable views of Williams and Dreben (however atrociously expressed by the latter) so bizarre. I am not advocating any form of relativism and its cogency here. Recall that I have not denied the universality of philosophy as such; I am only disputing the specific self understanding of modern philosophy as absolute critique. What the above discussion makes clear is that modern philosophy’s claims to be an absolute critique is only true when it is engaged in external (negative) criticism; normally it is not true when it partakes in internal criticism, especially when this internal criticism involves the fundamentals of the modern worldview. 
I have argued above (persuasively I hope) that Priest’s notion of philosophy as absolute critique is mistaken; it should rather be taken as the self-conception of modern philosophy alone. I have argued further that modern philosophy’s self-conception as absolute critique mostly applies only to its criticism of external forces and not to the fundamentals of its own worldview. When it comes to this it is as meek as any other enterprise in modern society (and at times even more so because of the guilty consciousness that stems from the explicit claim of its own status as absolute criticism). Having accomplished the above, it is easy to summarily dispose of three corollaries that Priest derives from his notion of philosophy as absolute critique, viz:  a) philosophy (read ‘modern philosophy’) is subversive; b) it is unsettling for students; c) it is universal in its import. I will briefly examine all these claims (and reject them as they stand – the rejection emanates from my discussion in the paper up to this point).

Subversiveness of Philosophy. Modern philosophy indeed claims to be subversive; but it is subversive only when it acts as critique of external forces (forces that are still lingering on from the ‘dark ages’, in its view). When it comes to its own internal matters philosophy is not only not subversive, in fact, it is highly conservative in the original sense of the word (the contemporary supporters of the American Republican Party do not have exclusive copyright on the term). It is conservative in the sense that it is the custodian of the worldview and civilisation that replaced the medieval Christian civilisation of Europe and then imposed itself (through whatever means) on almost the entire world.​[12]​ There are naturally differences of interpretation and emphasis among its different foci, but generally speaking it is a civilisation based on a strong belief in secularism, constitutional democracy, human rights, capitalism, and science. There are internal debates about these fundamentals within philosophy, but there is no dispute whatsoever about their desirability and the need to defend them singlehandedly. Philosophy today is part of well-established, global university system; most philosophy departments around the world follow the same sorts of topics, subjects, authors, and debates. Philosophers are not wandering outsiders. They write not in vernaculars as such; but in the official language of the empire (English) or in a few other main languages (basically French and German) which replaced Latin as official languages of higher education in Europe during 16th and 17th centuries and onwards.​[13]​ Philosophers are, relatively speaking, highly paid professionals and part of the ruling elite (defined broadly): the elite responsible for producing and reproducing the standard discourse about the self, the other and the universe, and the relationship between them. Philosophy today has almost the same role (perhaps combined with journalism) that religion played in the middle ages. Philosophers are at the forefront of defending modern civilisation, and at the battlefront of science wars, religious wars, evolutionary wars etc. It is a travesty to consider philosophy as a subversive force in today’s world; it is the prime conservative force today. In fact, it is the custodian of conservatism, as far as defending the basics of the prevailing secular capitalist worldview is concerned. 

Philosophy as unsettling subject for students: As a reflective subject philosophy questions our assumptions about ourselves, the other and the universe (for example) – there is no doubt about that. However, any reflective subject will do this; one can go through unsettling experiences reading history or physics, depending on the way they are taught and the way they are received. Philosophy as the subject which makes reflection and its possibility its prime concern is bound to be more unsettling than any other subject studied within the modern university. But the unsettling experience Priest is referring to must be more fundamental than the sort of unsettling experiences I just mentioned; it is related to his notion of philosophy as absolute critique, hence it must be conceived as the absolute unsettling experience. Is philosophy unsettling in the absolute sense? Perhaps, but principally only for students coming from backgrounds radically different from the secular modern worldview propagated by modern philosophy; it is not (typically) unsettling in the absolute sense for students with background beliefs mostly congruent with the modern worldview. Thus, a believing Jew or Muslim or Christian (to give a straightforward example) will generally feel the force of the absolutely unsettling nature of philosophy (if she lets herself be pulled by the lure of philosophy, that is), but a secular, progressive, animal loving, environment-cherishing liberal will unlikely to experience any such discomfort.​[14]​ The reason is obvious from our discussion in this paper. Modern philosophy is absolute critique only vis-a-vis the views which are external to its own preferred views; its venom and its cutting sword are reserved exclusively for the views which are historically challenged by her, and not the views which are constructively favoured by her (a different sort of critique is applied in that context). 

Philosophy as a universal pursuit: I believe in the universal import of philosophy, so I would not deny Priest’s claim that philosophy has this quality. But it is also clear from the context that what Priest is claiming is not the universal import of philosophy as such, but for his specific conception of philosophy as absolute critique. But, as I have shown, this conception of philosophy is specific to a particular juncture in human history, and, furthermore, is true only as self-understanding of this specific philosophy and not of its reality; in reality, even this specific philosophy is absolute critique only in the limited facets of its praxis. 
Modern philosophy emerged out of a revolutionary period in human history and as a revolutionary force, but it faces the dilemma which any revolutionary force must face. Once it is successful, every revolution must abolish any possibility of further revolution or counter-revolution. Any revolutionary force, once successful, must become fundamentally a non-revolutionary and conservative force; its main purpose becomes safeguarding the house it has successfully built. Its revolutionary venom expresses itself mainly in safeguarding its victory against the opposing forces. This is something very natural, and we cannot blame modern philosophy or any other revolutionary force on that account. What we can blame modern philosophy for, though, is its pretention that even after the victory it remains some sort of a revolutionary minority pitted against endless powerful enemies which are threatening to engulf her from everywhere. This is just not true. Modern philosophy is one of the ruling forces in the world today, and when it denies its ruling character, its conservative function, it becomes an ideology; and it is modern philosophy qua ideology and not qua philosophy that must be rejected. All ideologies are dangerous; especially those ideologies which pretend to be revolutionary forces. This is a lesson which we have (or should have) learnt from Paul Feyerabend, among others:

All ideologies must be seen in perspective. One must not take them too seriously. One must read them like fairytales which have lots of interesting things to say but which also contain wicked lies, or like ethical prescriptions which may be useful rules of thumb but which are deadly when followed to the letter. 
(Feyerabend, 1981, p. 156)

The notion of philosophy as absolute critique is one such fairytale today, and it is doubly dangerous because it is the custodian of other modern fairytales such as science, constitutional democracy etc. This is not to reject philosophy, science, or constitutional democracy, but to reject the elements of them which have become ideological. There is nothing inherently good or liberating about philosophy or science. 
Feyerabend’s discussion of science in this context provides strong support for the view I have taken in this paper towards modern philosophy. Comparing the different role that science played in 17th and 18th centuries to the one it plays today, he writes:

Any ideology that breaks the hold a comprehensive system of thought has on the minds of mend contributes to the liberation of man. Any ideology that makes man question inherited beliefs is an aid to enlightenment. A truth that reigns without checks and balances is a tyrant who must be overthrown, and any falsehood that can aid us in the overthrow of this tyrant is to be welcomed. It follows that 17th and 18th century science indeed was an instrument of liberation and enlightenment. It does not follow that science is bound to remain such an instrument. There is nothing inherent in science or any other ideology that makes it essentially liberating, Ideologies can deteriorate and become stupid religions.
(Feyerabend , 1981, pp. 156-157, emphasis retained)   

This exactly parallels my argument in this paper regarding modern philosophy, especially regarding the distinction between the role it played when it was a minority revolutionary force and the role it plays today, when it has become a dominant power (at least) in its own specific realm. 
	I have argued that modern philosophy’s conception as absolute critique is only one conception of philosophy among others, and even as one conception of philosophy it has its own limitations. I have also argued that the effort to universalise such a specific and narrow conception of philosophy is ideological in its character and inherently oppressive, especially in societies which do not share the historical experiences of 17th and 18th century Europe.​[15]​ Any pleas for reasserting the role of philosophy in Islamic culture must start from this point. Without rejecting this ideologically driven notion of philosophy outright, philosophy in general as a liberating force has no future in the Muslim world. Such ideologically driven philosophy comes across as part and parcel of the long imperialistic legacy of the Muslim world which is still alive and well. 
	But I want to conclude by saying that such an ideologically driven notion of philosophy is not the whole philosophy; fortunately, it is only a small part of philosophy as it is practiced throughout the world, including America and other first-world countries. And this is because philosophy as reflection on reflection, as thinking about thinking, is something universal and part of the human condition. Reflection and self-reflection, whether attributed to evolution or considered as God granted gifts, are regarded by most cultures as the essence of human beings, differentiating them from other beings,​[16]​ and philosophy – as the study of this unique capacity and the impulse to develop instruments to enhance this capacity – is an important human endeavour which is needed in every society and culture in order to survive and to develop a human civilisation enshrined with virtues of honour, courage, self-respect and independence of mind. Muslims have always treasured this; they developed the traditions of philosophy they inherited from Greeks, Persians, Indians and others as a truly collective human inheritance. What they were always suspicious of, though, was the philosophy when it becomes an ideology. Thus great Ghazali developed the critique of the Neo-Platonic philosophy of his time as a philosophy that was in danger of becoming an ideology, and was eroding the independent characteristics of Muslim culture.​[17]​ So should we today. 
Despite the role of philosophy as a dominant ideology in today’s world, the bulk of philosophy done is not ideological but constructive. This type of philosophy is necessary to develop thinking and reflective capacities of the individual, society, and culture. Islamic culture, like any other culture, needs these tools in order to deepen its understanding of itself and the other, reflectively, independently and critically. In this paper, I have used Professor Graham Priest’s views as a foil to develop my argument, but to be fair to Professor Priest, most of his own work in philosophy is not ideological at all. It is only when he attempts to develop his self understanding of philosophy qua philosophy that part of it comes across as very ideological. Most of Professor Priest’s own work, especially in logic, is in fact revolutionary; and any culture (including Islamic culture) would be impoverished if it were to be deprived of such work. What we need is Priest’s great work in logic, not his ideological views about what philosophy is. Similarly, just to give one more example, the counter-example method used by modern analytic philosophers should be learnt and should be part and parcel of the modern university education system because it is a great tool in enhancing  the power of the imagination,​[18]​ which in turn is crucial for developing the capacity to see alternative scenarios when considering an issue, and which is in turn crucial for assessing any issues regarding any subject matter critically and thoughtfully, and arriving at a considered judgement about it. 
We can pile on particular examples here, but that is something to be left for another occasion. What I have tried to do in this paper is to make a case against a particular conception of philosophy and to show that it is not the only conception of philosophy, and this I believe is the first step towards reasserting the role of philosophy in modern Islamic culture and reclaiming the great tradition established by the great and independent Muslim minds like Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyya,​[19]​ who were not afraid to learn from others, but who were conscious that you can learn from others fruitfully and respectfully only if you respect yourself and your independence. 
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^1	  Cf. Heidegger, 1956, p. 21ff. 
^2	  Some have suggested two fathers, one for the French side and the other for the English side; the English one is Francis Bacon (Copleston, 1994, p. 1). 
^3	  It is interesting to note that that almost none of the founders of modern philosophy were professional philosophers based in the universities of the day, and almost all of them wrote in the vernacular and not in Latin, the scholarly language of the day (Copleston, 1994, p. 5). 
^4	  In this paper I use these two terms interchangeably. 
^5	  Be they actually dominant or imagined to be so.
^6	  Here is how Kant himself saw things: “If we are asked, ‘Do we now live in an enlightened age?’ the answer is, ‘No,’ but we do live in an age of enlightenment. As things now stand, much is lacking which prevents men from being, or easily becoming, capable of correctly using their own reason in religious matters with assurance and free from outside direction. But on the other hand, we have clear indications that the field has now been opened wherein men may freely dea1 with these things and that the obstacles to general enlightenment or the release from self-imposed tutelage are gradually being reduced. In this respect, this is the age of enlightenment, or the century of Frederick” (Kant, 1784).
^7	  Henceforth I shall refer to criticism of anything/everything simply as absolute critique or absolute criticisms. 
^8	  I have used here the modified translation by Professor Clare O'Farrell as found on her website http://www.michel-foucault.com/quote/2001q.html accessed on 27 November 2010.
^9	  Again, in saying this I do not assume or imply in any way that either Islamic or European traditions are monolithic.
^10	  It is true that there are philosophers who have criticized Williams’ view of contingency implied here (for example John Cottingham, 2008), but then those philosophers have a more modest conception of philosophy than the one advocated by Priest and others, who are my target here.
^11	  Lest anyone think that these are isolated views of the characteristically combative Dreben and not those of Rawls, one should be reminded that Rawls himself likens the views that reject constitutional democracy to war and disease; He talks about “the practical task of containing them” as they are “war and disease” (Rawls, 1996, pp. 64 n19, also 64f). But one does not just contain diseases, one tries to eradicate them!
^12	  My analysis here and below is purely functional; I don’t assume that philosophers or philosophy do any of this consciously; this should exclude any suspicion of a ‘conspiracy-theory’ approach.
^13	  My claims here exclude the Eastern European scene, with which I have only very superficial acquaintance.
^14	  She would (typically) rather find confirmation of her views (and hence comfort and reassurance) in her experience with philosophy.
^15	  This last claim follows from my discussion of the different roles of internal and external criticism within modern philosophy.
^16	  But does not necessarily separate them from other beings, and also it should not be seen as the basis for asserting human superiority over other beings (v. Rizvi, 2010, 53-78).
^17	  V. al - Ghazali, 2002. 
^18	  See Williamsons, 2010, for the importance of imagination for critical thinking. 
^19	  Ibn Taymiyya developed a critique of Greek logic which anticipates some of the criticism of Greek logic developed by John Stuart Mill in the 19th century (v. Hallaq, 1993). Oliver Leaman claims that: “Some opponents of philosophy such as Ibn Taymiyya even went so far as to criticize logic itself . . . .” (Leaman, 1998), as if logic is some sort of sacred cow which cannot be touched!! Apparently Leaman does not recognize the distinction between criticizing (parts) of Greek logic and rejecting logic as such!! Though in his revised entry Leaman is much more cautious in his assertions: “Many theologians who attacked philosophy were staunch defenders of logic as a tool for disputation, and Ibn Taymiyya  is unusual in the strong critique which he provided of Aristotelian logic. He argued that the logic entails Aristotelian metaphysics, and so should be abandoned by anyone who wishes to avoid philosophical infection” (Leaman, 1998a).
